The Channel of Discord: how the Taliban project threatens Central Asia with drought

On the international agenda, security issues are often reduced to traditional threats – military aggression, nuclear weapons or economic pressure. However, one of the most dangerous points of tension in the future may arise due to a basic need – access to water. Even in today’s interconnected world, where international treaties are designed to promote cooperation, water scarcity is already aggravating relations in Central Asia. In particular, the Taliban’s construction of the 285-kilometer Qosh-Tepa canal is becoming a serious pressure factor in the region, says Dilnoza Ubaidullayeva, a lecturer at the National Security College at the Australian National University, in her article for The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s The Strategist.

The canal, which is currently being built in the north of Afghanistan, is designed to divert water from the Amu Darya River flowing from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It is expected that after completion of construction, it will take from 20 to 30 percent of the total flow of the river, which will be a heavy blow to downstream states. Uzbekistan, with a rapidly growing population of more than 39 million people, is heavily dependent on the Amu Darya for irrigation and food security. Turkmenistan also relies heavily on the river to sustain its agricultural production. The potential loss of water endangers the economy, living standards and long-term stability of both countries.

Water problems in Central Asia are not new. The region is still struggling with the consequences of the drying up of the Aral Sea – one of the world’s largest man-made environmental disasters. In the 1960s, the irrigation policy of the Soviet Union led to the diversion of huge amounts of water from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers for cotton production. This overuse has turned the once fourth largest lake in the world into a salt desert, destroying ecosystems and the lives of local communities.

Climate change today exacerbates this burden. Summer in the region is getting hotter, accompanied by record waves of heat and prolonged droughts. Glaciers in the upstream countries are rapidly melting, which in the long term leads to a reduction in the flow of meltwater into rivers and exacerbates water scarcity. These factors make every drop in the Amu Darya more valuable and controversial than ever before. Against this background, the Qosh-Tepa channel risks becoming the last straw. Residents of the southern regions of Uzbekistan report that they are already suffering from droughts exacerbated by climate change and cannot grow crops due to lack of water. Commissioning of the canal may leave many with no choice but to migrate to other parts of the country, since access to even drinking water may be limited.

The Taliban movement has made it clear that Afghanistan, as a upstream country, has the right to use the Amu Darya water. Its representatives claim that the diversion of part of the river runoff is necessary for their own agricultural needs and the economic development of the country. Uzbekistan, which is likely to suffer the most from the construction of the canal, has so far adhered to the tactic of quiet diplomacy. Officials conducted non-public negotiations with the Taliban, seeking to reach a compromise or achieve technical adjustments to the project. However, public discontent is growing inside Uzbekistan, as many consider the government’s approach too passive. Concerns are compounded by the poor quality of canal construction. According to reports, the project is being implemented with limited technical experience and without meeting proper engineering standards, which raises concerns about the possible loss of large volumes of diverted water and unintended damage to the environment.

One of the most difficult aspects of the dispute is the lack of a binding legal framework between Afghanistan and its neighbors. The Taliban Government is not internationally recognized and is not a party to key international treaties on water resources. Currently, the Central Asian countries regulate transboundary water issues on the basis of the Almaty Agreement of 1992, which distributes river resources between the former Soviet republics. The Taliban are not a party to this agreement. Afghanistan has also not signed the UN Convention on Watercourses, which establishes the principles of equitable and sustainable use of shared rivers. Without a formal treaty or international recognition, the Central Asian States have reason to doubt that the Taliban will comply with any commitments reached during the negotiations. This legal vacuum significantly complicates the joint management of resources.

However, the Central Asian states are not only concerned about water. Uzbekistan is particularly concerned about the possible spread of extremist ideology from Afghanistan. Many remember the Taliban’s past ties to radical groups operating in the region. The population of Uzbekistan is young, and for decades after the collapse of the USSR, the state tightly controlled the religious sphere. This has created a social environment in which religious narratives, including extremist interpretations, can quickly gain popularity if not managed carefully.

There are fears that if Uzbekistan takes a tougher stance on the Qosh-Tepa channel, the Taliban may resort to the tactics of the “gray zone” – covert support for radical movements, undermining social stability and challenging secular governance in Central Asian countries. This risk complicates an already delicate water dispute. Despite this, some consider water to be a non-negotiable resource. If the canal is completed in accordance with the plan and begins to divert 20 percent of the Amu Darya runoff, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will have to make difficult decisions. One option is to rebuild their water use and agriculture systems, abandoning moisture–loving crops such as cotton, and investing in modern irrigation technologies. But such changes require many years and significant resources. Another option is to exert stronger political pressure on the Taliban, which risks escalating tensions and provoking the very instability they seek to avoid.

The most likely outcome may be a combination of both strategies, but neither of them will eliminate the root cause of the risk. The Amu Darya’s water resources are finite, and as the population grows and the effects of climate change worsen, the pressure will only increase. In this sense, the Qosh-Tepa channel is a test of Central Asia’s ability to manage vital common resources in conditions of political uncertainty, environmental stress and mutual distrust. The question is not whether tensions will escalate, but when. Without joint solutions, transparent management and, possibly, international mediation, the shortage of water in Central Asia provoked by the Qosh-Tepa canal can cause a regional crisis.

Original (in Russian): Канал раздора: как проект талибов угрожает Центральной Азии засухой